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COMMENTS ]

The Fate Of Historical Preservation Laws
In Pennsylvania
I. Introduction
On July 10, 1991, in United Artists Theater Circuit,Inc. v. City
1 the Pennsylvania Supreme
of Philadelphia,
Court held that Philadelphia's Historic Preservation ordinance, as. applied to the Boyd
Theater, was unfair, unjust, and amounted to an unconstitutional
taking of private property without just compensation in violation of
Article 1, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.2 The United
Artists decision stands alone among historic preservation cases and
casts doubt on the legitimacy of landmark and historic district ordinances in Pennsylvania. The decision has received much attention
and criticism from preservationists throughout Pennsylvania and the
nation.
Part Two of this Comment will explain the different tests courts
use to determine if an unconstitutional taking has occurred. Part
Three will trace the development of historic preservation legislation.
Part Four will combine the analysis of the preceding two parts and
examine takings challenges to historic preservation ordinances. Part
Five will examine and critique the holding of United Artists. Part
Six will analyze the impact of the United Artists decision on other
1. 595 A.2d 6 (Pa. 1991).
2. Article 1, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides "nor shall private
property be taken or applied to public use, without authority of law and without just compensation being first made or secured." PA. CONST. art. I, § 10.
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preservation legislation in Pennsylvania and suggest reforms for Philadelphia's preservation ordinance. Finally, Part Seven will briefly explain the trend of preservation cases in other states.
II.

Development of the Takings Issue
The framers of the Constitution embodied their belief in the

sanctity of private property in the Fifth Amendment's prohibition
against taking private property for public use without just compensation.' The United States Supreme Court has recognized that regulation may amount to a taking,4 but determining when a regulation
results in a taking has proven to be problematic.' The Court has
repeatedly stated that whether a taking has occurred must be determined on a case-by-case basis and by evaluation of the specific facts
of each case.' The Constitution protects both the possession and
value of property, 7 but the degree of protection accorded possession
is significantly different from the degree of protection accorded
value. In this part of the Comment, I will briefly set forth the United

States Supreme Court's approach in determining when an unconstitutional taking has occurred.
A.

Possession

Courts are extremely protective of property owners' rights of
possession and generally label even the slightest interference with
possession as a taking requiring just compensation. 8 In Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,9 the Court found a taking
3. The Fifth Amendment provides "nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Justice Holmes stated the
general rule that "[w]hile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking." Id. at 415.
5. One commentator described the problem of determining when a taking has occurred
as "the most haunting jurisprudential problem in the field of contemporary land-use law...
one that may be the lawyer's equivalent of the physicist's hunt for the quark." CHARLES M.
HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING 766 (3d ed. 1977).
6. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (stating
that there is no set formula for determining when a taking has occurred, rather courts engage
in ad hoc factual inquiries). See also Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980)
(noting that there is no precise rule for determining when property has been taken); United
States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958) (observing that finding a
taking depends upon the particular circumstances of the case).
7. Stephen A. Siegel, Understandingthe Nineteenth Century Contract Clause: The Role
of the Property-Privilege Distinction and "Takings" Clause Jurisprudence, 60 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 76 (1986).
8. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1184 (1967) ("Courts
• . .never deny compensation for a physical takeover.").
9. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). Loretto involved a New York statute that required landlords to
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even though the regulation resulted in an encroachment on the property of only one-eighth of a cubic foot of space. 10 Stressing that
physical invasion of property is the most serious form of interference
with an owner's property rights," the Court explained that when a
physical invasion occurs the government does not just take one
strand from the property rights bundle but rather takes a portion of
every strand in the bundle.12 A physical invasion destroys the
owner's right to possess, to use, and to dispose of the property.' 3 The
Loretto case makes it clear that any permanent physical occupation
caused by a regulation is a per se taking even though it has only a
minimal economic impact on the property owner.
B.

Value

In direct opposition to the Court's stance regarding interference
with possession is its stance regarding interference with value. Regulations that greatly interfere with the value of property have survived
takings challenges. 4 To facilitate its analysis, the Court has identified a number of factors or tests used in determining when a regulation which interferes with the value of property amounts to a taking.
Which test or tests a court applies depends upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case.' 5 No one test is conclusive, and
courts frequently use a combination of tests.
1. Noxious Use.-When faced with the question of whether a
taking had occurred, early courts would examine how the property
was used. If the court determined that the property was a nuisance
no taking would be found no matter how severely the regulation affected the property.'6 The Court in Mugler v. Kansas17 saw a dispermit a cable television company to install cable facilities on the landlord's property.
10. Id. at 443 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 435.
12. Id. The Court has conceptually analyzed property as a bundle of rights. The bundle
must be viewed as a whole and the destruction of one strand in the bundle does not necessarily
amount to a taking. Andrews v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979).
13. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982). See
also United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945) (explaining that
property consists of the right to possess, to use, and to dispose of the property).
14. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
15. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (sand and gravel
pit); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (brick yard); Reinman v. City of Little
Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (livery stable); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (beer
manufacturing); Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878) (fertilizer
manufacturing plant); Pompano Horse Club, Inc. v. Bryan, Ill So. 801 (Fla. 1927) (gambling
facility); Thrasher v. Smith, 114 N.E. 31 (Ill. 1916) (bawdyhouse).
17. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
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tinct difference between regulations which abate nuisances and regulations which take private property for public use.18 Justice Harlan

remarked that "[i]n the one case, a nuisance only is abated; in the
other, unoffending property is taken away from an innocent
owner." 19 Justice Harlan reasoned that a regulation which prohibits
a nuisance does not restrict the property owner's right to dispose of
the property and does not disturb the owner's use of the property for
lawful purposes.2 0 The noxious use test has been criticized because a
use often is labelled a nuisance solely because of its location or the
nature of the surrounding area.21 Today courts rarely use the nox-

ious use test.22

2. Economic Impact.-One important factor in determining if
a regulation amounts to a taking is the economic impact the regulation has on the property. Courts will examine the diminution in value
of the property caused by the regulation,28 the uses to which the
property may be put after enactment of the regulation,2 4 and the
25
investment backed expectations of the owner.
a. Diminution in value.-In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,2" the Court set forth the diminution-in-value test. Justice
Holmes reasoned that government could not survive if it had to pay
for every diminishment in value caused by its regulations.2 7 Property
owners hold their property subject to an implied limitation that the
government may regulate private property by use of its police powers.2 8 The government's power, however, has limits. 29 When the dim18. Id. at 669. In Mugler, a beer manufacturer challenged Kansas' prohibition of the
manufacture of intoxicating liquors. The court labeled the manufacture of beer a nuisance and
found no taking. Id. at 668-69.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), Justice Sutherland
described a nuisance as a "pig in a parlor instead of the barnyard." Id. at 388.
22. Despite criticism, the noxious use test is occasionally resurrected. See Nassr v. Commonwealth, 477 N.E.2d 987 (Mass. 1985)(hazardous waste operation); Kuban v. McGimsey,
605 P.2d 623 (Nev. 1980)(brothel).
23. See infra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
26. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). The Pennsylvania statute at issue prohibited the mining of
anthracite coal in a manner causing the subsidence of land on which houses were built. Id. at
412-13.
27. Id. at 413.
28. Id. Police powers are the state's power to pass laws for the health, safety, morals,
and general welfare of its citizens. Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311, 317 (1907). See also
Robinson v. Town Council, 199 A. 308, 313 (R.I. 1938) (explaining that the government has
the power to enact zoning laws in the public interest and for the general welfare).
29. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
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inution in value reaches a certain magnitude, the government must

exercise its power of eminent domain and compensate the owner.30
The Court found that the regulation in Pennsylvania Coal made it
commercially impracticable for the owner to mine coal on the regulated land and, therefore, destroyed the value of the owner's mining

rights.31 Accordingly, the court struck down the regulation as an unconstitutional taking."
Although the Court announced the diminution-in-value test, it
gave no indication just how much diminution in value would be tolerated before a taking is found. Since Pennsylvania Coal, courts
have allowed substantial diminution in value without finding a taking.3 The seminal zoning case applying the diminution-in-value test
is Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co."' In Euclid the Court
rejected the takings challenge to a zoning ordinance even though it
had the effect of reducing the value of the land by seventy-five percent, or $510,000.00.35 Although the diminution-in-value test is not
conclusive, it is used by many courts. 36
b. Reasonable use.-Courts also examine how the property
may be used after the regulation. A taking does not occur just be7
cause the owner is denied the highest and best use of the property.
Courts examine whether the property owner is left with any econom30. Id.
31. Id. at 414.
32. Id. at 416.
33. See, e.g., William C. Haas & Co. v. City of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir.
1979) (allowing diminishment in value of $1,900,000.00); HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 542
P.2d 237 (Cal. 1975) (allowing diminishment in value of $325,000.00); Brown v. City of
Fremont, 142 Cal. Rptr. 46 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (allowing diminishment in value of
$2,825,000.00); Maywood Proviso State Bank v. Village of Berkeley, 204 N.E.2d 144 (Il1.
App. Ct. 1965) (allowing diminishment in value of $164,000.00); Hoffmann v. Waukegan, 201
N.E.2d 177 (I11.App. Ct. 1964) (allowing diminishment in value of $350,000.00); Pederson v.
Harrison, 175 N.W.2d 817 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970) (allowing diminishment in value of
$99,000.00); Wrigley Properties, Inc. v. City of Ladue, 369 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1963) (allowing
diminishment in value of $400,000.00).
34. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The Village of Euclid adopted a zoning ordinance that rezoned
an area from industrial to residential. A portion of claimant's land was within the rezoned
area.
35. Id. at 384.
36. Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L. 36, 50 (1964).
37. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962) ("Concededly, the ordinance completely prohibits a beneficial use to which the property was previously devoted.
However, . . . the fact that it deprives the property of its most beneficial use does not render it
unconstitutional."); see also Board of County Comm'rs v. Mountain Air Ranch, 563 P.2d 341,
344 (Colo. 1977) (explaining that regulations do not have to allow the highest and best use of
the subject property); S.A. Healy Co. v. Town of Highland Beach, 355 So.2d 813, 814 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that a regulation is not invalid solely because it prevents the
most economically advantageous use of the property).
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ically reasonable use of the property. If so, no taking is found.38
However, what one court considers reasonable economic use
may be different from what another court considers reasonable eco-

nomic use.39 For example, both a California Court of Appeals40 and

the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court 41 upheld restrictions on land
in a floodplain. The restrictions limited the use of the land to agricultural and recreational purposes. 42 On the other hand, the Supreme Court of New Jersey found that similar restrictions on
swampland constituted a taking.4 3 The restrictions limited the use of
the land to agricultural, recreational, and other specifically permitted uses. 44 In effect, the California, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey
courts disagreed about whether restrictions that limit land to agricultural and recreational uses leave the owner with any economically
reasonable use of the property.
c. Investment Backed Expectations.-Courts examine how
a regulation affects the property owner's expectations concerning the
use of the property. 45 A court is more likely to find a taking if the
regulation prohibits the owner from using the property in a manner
in which the owner reasonably expected.4 1 In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,47 the owner's investment backed expectations were the determining factor in finding a taking. The Court held that the EPA
38. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (noting that regulations effect a
taking if they deny an owner all economically viable use of the land).
39. The Court in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470
(1987), upheld a Pennsylvania coal mining subsidence law similar to the one the Court struck
down in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). The Keystone Court reasoned
that the regulation still allowed the property owner to mine approximately fifty percent of the
value of its coal; thus, the owner was left with a reasonable economic use, and there was no
taking. 480 U.S. at 501.
40. Turner v. County of Del Norte, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
41. Gaebel v. Thornbury Twp., 303 A.2d 57 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
42. Turner, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 95; Gaebel, 303 A.2d at 59.
43. Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 193
A.2d 232 (N.J. 1963).
44. Id. at 236.
45. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164 (1979); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
46. The idea of investment backed expectations is similar to the zoning idea of prior
nonconforming uses. Most zoning ordinances allow a property owner to continue to use the
property in the manner in which it was used prior to enactment of the zoning regulation. Gross
v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 227 A.2d 824, 826-27 (1967) (stating that the owner of property
being used as a lawful pre-existing nonconforming use has a vested property right in the nonconforming use).
47. 467 U.S. 986 (1984). Pursuant to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, Monsanto Co., an inventor and developer of pesticides, submitted its formulas to the
EPA. Monsanto argued that the EPA's disclosure of its formulas constituted a taking. After
first determining that the formulas or trade secrets were property subject to the Fifth Amendment the Court considered the takings issue. Id. at 1004.
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took Mansanto's trade secrets during the years 1972-1978 because
during those years Monsanto reasonably expected that its trade
secrets would be kept confidential.4 Before 1972 and after 1978,
however, Monsanto did not have such an expectation, or if it did, it
was not reasonable, and therefore there was no taking.4 9 If a property owner is or should be aware of property restrictions before the
owner purchases the property any expectations the owner has regarding the prohibited uses of the property can not be considered
reasonable.
3. Reciprocity of Advantage.-Another important factor or
test courts use to determine if a taking has occurred is reciprocity of
advantage. When using this test, 50 courts examine whether the regulation applies to all property owners in the area in a similar way.
Many regulations, such as zoning ordinances, have been upheld on
the ground that the regulation provides an average reciprocity of advantage to all land owners affected by the regulation. 5 1 Although
each property owner may be burdened somewhat by the regulation,
each property owner is also benefitted by the restrictions which are
placed on surrounding property owners. It is not necessary for the
benefits received by the property owner to equal or outweigh the burdens placed on the owner. 2 Reciprocity of advantage is an important
consideration when courts are determining if historic district ordinances have effected a taking of private property.
As the preceding discussion indicates, there are no clear standards or bright line tests in the takings area. The case- by-case approach and lack of clear standards make it difficult to predict if a
court will find a taking. What is clear, however, is that the party
seeking to establish a taking must overcome a heavy burden.
48. Id. at 1011. During these years the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act explicitly provided for protection of trade secrets from disclosure. Id. at 1010-11.
49. Id. at 1010.
50. The reciprocity of advantage test was set forth in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922). The Court in Pennsylvania Coal found no reciprocal advantage and
determined that the regulation impaired the value of the owner's property without conferring a
benefit on the owner. Id. at 415.
51. For example, tax cases have been justified on the ground that the taxpayer receives a
benefit from the government's use of the tax dollars for the public good. Noble State Bank v.
Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111 (1911).
52. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). Justice Stevens observed that the court is not required to calculate whether a specific property owner
burdened by the regulation receives a benefit equal to the burden. Id. at 491 n.21. He noted
that "[n]ot every individual gets a full dollar return in benefits for the taxes he or she pays;
yet, no one suggests that an individual has a right to compensation for the difference between
taxes paid and the dollar value of benefits received." Id.
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Historic Preservation Legislation

During the past several decades the goal of protecting historic
structures and historic districts from destruction or modification has
been widely recognized.
A.

Federal Legislation

Congress first recognized the importance of historic preservation
by enacting the Antiquities Act of 1906. 5 ' The Antiquities Act authorized the President to proclaim historically and scientifically significant landmarks located on federal land as national monuments. 5"
In 1935, the Historic Sites Act declared preservation of historic sites,
buildings, and objects a national policy.55 The most important federal legislation on the subject of historical preservation came in 1966
with the passage of the National Historic Preservation Act. 5" Reaffirming the importance of the nation's historic and cultural foundations, the Act declared historical preservation to be in the public interest. 5' The National Historic Preservation Act expanded the
National Register of Historic Places to include "districts, sites,
buildings, structures, and objects significant in American history, ar58
chitecture, archeology, engineering, and culture."
In 1980, Congress amended the National Historic Preservation
Act to require the owner's consent before a property or district is
placed on the National Register." Owners whose property is included on the National Register qualify for federal tax incentives
and federal grant programs. 60 Furthermore, the Act requires the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation to comment on the effect
federal projects may have on property listed on the Register. 1 Many
53.

Pub. L. No. 59-209, 34 Stat. 225 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 9§ 431-433

(1988)).
54. Id.
55. Pub. L. No. 74-292, 49 Stat. 666 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 9§ 461-467
(1988)).
56. Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 915 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1988)).
57. The declaration of policy section of the National Historic Preservation Act provides
that "the preservation of this irreplaceable heritage is in the public interest so that its vital
legacy of cultural, educational, aesthetic, inspirational, economic, and energy benefits will be
maintained and enriched for future generations of Americans." 16 U.S.C. § 470(b)(4) (1988).
58. Id. § 470(a)(1)(A).
59. Id. § 470(a)(6).
60. Federal matching grants are made to the states for the purpose of historic preservation. These grants may be used to improve privately owned property. Brenda Barrett, Some
Considerations in the Development Process, in HISTORIC PRESERVATION 256, 261 (Pa. Bar
Inst. 1984).
61. 16 U.S.C. § 470(f) (1988).
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properties are included on the National Register; 2 however, inclu-

sion on the National Register does not protect historically significant
property from private action. 63 State and local legislation is neces-

sary to prevent a property owner from altering or demolishing a historically significant structure.
B.

State and Local Legislation

The most significant preservation activity takes place at the local level. In our constitutional system, however, the police power is
vested in the state and must be delegated to municipalities for implementation." All fifty states have enacted some form of historic preservation legislation,6 5 usually in the form of enabling legislation

granting municipalities the power to designate historic districts66 or

landmarks.67 Local involvement in historic preservation began in
1931 when the City of Charleston, South Carolina enacted an ordinance creating the Old Charleston Historic District. 68 Five years
later, Louisiana passed historic district legislation protecting the
Vieux Carre.69 Over the last half century, the number of historical
preservation laws has increased dramatically.70 By 1989, all fifty
71
states and more than 1500 communities had enacted such laws.
C.

Pennsylvania Legislation
Pennsylvania entered the historical preservation field in 1929

62.
Register.
1991, at
63.
64.

More than 2500 Pennsylvania properties and districts are included on the National
Alan J. Heavans, National Register: A Matter of Status, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 14,
JoI.
Id.
James P. Beckwith, Jr., Significant State Historic PreservationStatutes, 21 INFORMATION: FROM THE NAT'L TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION 2 (1979).
65. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 107 (1978).
66. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-462,01(A)(10) (1990); IDAHO CODE § 674607-19 (1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, para. 11-48.2-1 to .2-7 (Smith-Hurd 1990); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 138.71-.75 (West 1979).
67. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, para. 11-48.2-2 (Smith-Hurd 1990).
68. RICHARD J. RODDEWIG, PREPARING A HISTORIC PRESERVATION ORDINANCE I (Am.
Planning Ass'n 1983).
69. In 1936 the Louisiana Constitution was amended authorizing the preservation of the
buildings in the Vieux Carre section of New Orleans. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 22A.
70. In 1957 there were eleven local ordinances, in 1965 there were 51, and by 1983
there were 1000. RODDEWIG, supra note 68, at 1.
71. RICHARD J. RODDEWIG AND CHRISTOPHER J.DUERKSEN, RESPONDING TO THE TAKINGS CHALLENGE: A GUIDE FOR OFFICIALS AND PLANNERS 23 (Am. Planning Ass'n 1989).
Justice Brennan observed that the increase in the number of preservation laws is a result of
two factors: 1) recognition that a large number of historic structures have been destroyed in
recent years; and 2) the widely shared belief that historic structures enhance the quality of life
for the entire community. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 108
(1978).
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when the General Assembly created the Pennsylvania Historical and
Museum Commission. 2 The Commission7 3 is charged with preserving public records, documents, and objects, and encouraging and
supporting historic preservation efforts throughout the Commonwealth.7 4 The Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission has
the authority to designate a Historic Preservation Board.7 5 The

Board nominates property for inclusion on the Pennsylvania Register
of Historic Places.76 As with the Federal Register, inclusion on the
Pennsylvania Register requires the consent of the property owner or

a majority of the property owners in a district.77 The Historic Preservation Act also requires Commonwealth agencies to consult the

Commission before demolishing, altering or transferring any historically significant property under their control.78 Furthermore, the Act
requires the Commission to be consulted regarding the location and
design of any state assisted project which may affect the preservation

of property listed or eligible for inclusion on the Pennsylvania
Register. 9
It was not until 1961 that Pennsylvania passed enabling legislation allowing municipalities to create historic districts.8 0 The stated
purpose of the 1961 Act was to promote the general welfare, education and culture of the community by protecting historical areas,
making them a source of inspiration, and awakening interest in the
past." l The Act authorized municipalities, except first and second
class cities, to create local historic districts.8 2 Once a municipality
creates an historic district, the governing body of the municipality,
with the advice of a Board of Historical Architectural Review, 83
1

72.

Act of April 9, 1929, Pub. L. No. 177 (codified as amended at 37 PA. CONS. STAT.

ANN. §§ 101-104 (1992 Supp.)).

73. The Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission consists of the Secretary of
Education, or his designee, nine residents of. the Commonwealth, and four members of the
General Assembly. 37 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 104 (1992 Supp.).
74. Id. § 301.
75. Id. § 504. The Board consists of at least nine residents of the Commonwealth including at least one individual competent in each of the following fields: architecture, archaeology, architectural history, history and historic preservation.
76. Id. § 505(2).
77. Id. § 503.
78. 37 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 508 (1991 Supp.).
79. Id. § 510.
80. Act of June 13, 1961, P.L. 282 No. 167 (codified as amended at PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
53, §§ 8001-8006 (1986 & Supp. 1992)).
81. Id. § 8002.
82. Section 8002 provides that an ordinance creating a historic district is not effective
until the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission has certified the historical significance of the district. Id.
83. Id. Section 8003 provides that the Board of Historical Architectural Review shall
consist of not less than five members, one member being a registered architect, one a licensed
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must issue a certificate of appropriateness before any permit for
erection, demolition, or alteration is granted for a structure within
the district.8 4 The Act mandates that the governing body consider
the possible effect any proposed change will have on the general historic and architectural nature of the district. The governing body,
however, may consider only the appropriateness of exterior architec85
tural features which can be seen from a public street or way.
IV.
A.

Takings Challenges to Historic Preservation Ordinances
Challenges in Federal Court

In 1975 the Fifth Circuit dealt with the takings question in the
context of historic district legislation. In Maher v. City of New Orleans 6 the court determined that a New Orleans ordinance creating
the Vieux Carre87 historic district did not amount to an unconstitutional taking of property. 8 Maher owned a victorian cottage within
the Vieux Carre, which he sought to demolish and replace with an
apartment complex. 89 The historic district ordinance required a permit for any alteration, construction, or demolition of a building
within the district.90 The City Council denied the permit and Maher
brought suit.9 1
The court first determined that the ordinance's purpose of historic preservation was legitimate and its means reasonable. 92 The
court then found that denying the permit did not amount to a taking.
Denial of the permit did not foreclose all reasonable economic use of
the property.9 3 Maher failed to show that sale was impracticable,
that commercial rental could not provide a reasonable return on his
real estate broker, one a building inspector, and the remaining members being individuals with
knowledge and interest in historic districts.
84. Id. § 8004.
85. Act of June 13, 1961, P.L. 282 No. 167 (codified as amended at PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
53, § 8004 (1986 & Supp. 1992)).
86. 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975).
87. The Vieux Carre district is commonly known as the French Quarter of New Orleans. Id. at 1053.
88. Id. at 1067.
89. Id. at 1054.
90. Id.
91. Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1054 (1975).
92. Due process requires that the state's purpose be legitimate and the means employed
to achieve that purpose be reasonable. Id. at 1059. The legislature enacted the ordinance in
order to promote the social and economic goals of preserving the historical district. The legislature determined that preservation was in the public interest. The court stated that where the
legislative determination is even fairly debatable the court can not substitute its judgment for
that of the legislature. Accordingly, the court held that the objective of the ordinance was
within the permissible scope of the police powers. Id. at 1061.
93. Id. at 1066.
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investment, or that other uses of the property were foreclosed.94
The court also addressed the claim that the affirmative maintenance provision of the ordinance, which required property owners to
keep buildings within the district in good repair, overstepped the police power and amounted to a taking.95 The court found that upkeep
of buildings within the district was reasonably necessary to accomplish the legitimate goals of the ordinance, and the required out-ofpocket expenses did not constitute a taking. 96 The court stressed that
its decision was a narrow one, and that there may be occasions
where application of the affirmative maintenance provision or denial
of a permit would be unduly oppressive on the property owner. In
that case, application of the ordinance would amount to a taking.9"
In Penn Central TransportationCo. v. City of New York, 98 the
Supreme Court considered the takings issue in regard to a landmark
historic preservation ordinance. The Court held that application of
New York City's landmarks law to Grand Central Terminal did not
constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment.99 Under New
York's ordinance, the owner of a landmark had an affirmative duty
to keep the exterior of the building in good repair, 100 and the
Landmarks Preservation Commission had to approve any alterations
to the landmark.0 '
On August 2, 1967, the Commission designated the Grand Central Terminal as a landmark over the objection of the owner, Penn
Central.1 02 In 1968, Penn Central applied for permission to build a
multistory office building on top of the terminal.1 03 The Commission
denied the building permit, and Penn Central filed suit claiming that
94. Id.
95. Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1066 (5th Cir. 1975).
96. The court noted that the out-of-pocket expenses were similar to out-of-pocket expenses owners are required to incur in providing sprinkler systems and emergency facilities for
safety reasons and plumbing and sewage systems for health reasons. Id. at 1067. Because the
goal of historic preservation is in the public interest the out-of-pocket expenses are not per se
confiscatory. Id.
•97. Id. at 1067.
98. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
99. Id. at 138. The ordinance in question provided for the designation of both historic
districts and individual landmarks.
100. Id. at 111-12.
101. Id. at 112.
102. Id. at 115.
103. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 116 (1978). Penn
Central submitted two separate building plans both of which conformed to applicable zoning
ordinances. Under a lease agreement Penn Central had entered into, it would have received
one million dollars a year during the construction of the office building and three million a
year thereafter. Id.
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the ordinance had taken its property without just compensation. 0'
The Court pointed out that it had on numerous occasions recognized that land use regulations may legitimately be enacted in order
to enhance the quality of life by preserving the character and aesthetic features of a city. 105 The Supreme Court held that Penn Central only proved that it had been denied the most profitable use of its
property.106 The Court reaffirmed the established rule that a regulation may deprive an owner of the highest and best use of the property without effecting a taking.1 07 The relevant inquiry involves the
regulation's economic impact, including the impact on the owner's
investment backed expectations, and whether the regulation allows
any economically reasonable use of the property.10 8 Because the
landmark designation and the denial of the building permit did not
prevent Penn Central from continuing to use the property as a terminal it did not interfere with Penn Central's primary investment
backed expectations.10 9 Moreover, the ordinance did not deny Penn
Central all economically reasonable use of the property. "' To the
contrary, Penn Central could continue to make a profit on the terminal and obtain a reasonable return on its investment. "1
Penn Central claimed that New York's regulation of individual
landmarks is different from general zoning or historic district legislation because it singles out individual property owners to bear the
burden of historic preservation. " 2 The Court rejected Penn Central's
argument and found that the regulation was part of a comprehensive
city wide preservation plan.113 Although the ordinance places special
restrictions on the owner of property designated as a landmark, the
104. Id. at 119.
105. Id. at 129. See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1
(1974); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). Penn Central did not dispute that historic
preservation is a legitimate state objective and that the restrictions imposed by New York's
ordinance were reasonably related to achieving that objective. Penn Central Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 129 (1978).
106. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 120 (1978).
107. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 37-49 and accompanying text.
109. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.at 133.
113. The Court stated that the ordinance was not like reverse spot zoning. Id. at 132.
Spot zoning is the arbitrary and unreasonable zoning of a small parcel of land, a singling out
of a piece of property for different treatment than similar surrounding parcels. Cleaver v.
Board of Adjustment, 200 A.2d 408, 415 (Pa. 1964). The Court found it significant that
thirty-one districts and over four hundred landmarks had already been designated pursuant to
the ordinance, including many located close to the terminal. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City
of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 132 (1978).
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Court emphasized that "the major theme of the law is to ensure the
owners ... both a 'reasonable return' on their investments and maximum latitude to use their parcels for purposes not inconsistent with
the preservation goals."11
The Court accepted the City Council's judgment that historic
preservation benefits all the citizens of New York City "both economically and by improving the quality of life as a whole.""' Using
Justice Holmes' terminology the ordinance provided an average reciprocity of advantage."1 6 Furthermore, the Court stressed that the
regulation's transferable development rights program mitigated
whatever financial burdens the ordinance placed on the property
owner.

11 7

In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist concluded that New York
City's landmark ordinance as applied to Grand Central Terminal
constituted a taking.1" 8 He examined what he considered to be the
two situations when the destruction of property does not constitute a
taking - when the property is used for a noxious use and when the
regulation provides an average reciprocity of advantage. 119 First,
Justice Rehnquist easily concluded that the noxious use test did not
apply because use of the terminal did not amount to a nuisance nor
would the proposed office building have constituted a noxious use.120
Second, Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the majority's conclusion
that the restrictions on the terminal were part of a comprehensive
scheme conferring an average reciprocity of advantage.' He argued
that the restrictions on the property and the affirmative duty to
maintain the property constituted a substantial burden on Penn Central with little or no concomitant benefit.'
Unlike zoning which limits the uses of property, New York's
114. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 110 (1978).
115. Id. at 134.
116. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
117. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978). New
York City's zoning regulations allowed owners who had not developed their property to the
extent allowed by the regulation to transfer development rights to contiguous properties.
Landmark owners were allowed to transfer development rights not only to contiguous property
but also to properties across the street or intersection from the landmark. The majority found
that Penn Central could readily use these transferable development rights because it owned
several other properties in the area which were eligible to receive them. Id.
118. Id. at 143 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 144-48.
120. Id. at 145.
121. Id. at 147. Justice Rehnquist noted that the landmark ordinance affected less than
one tenth of one percent of the buildings in the city.
122. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 148 (1978)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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ordinance required the owner of a landmark to preserve the property
as a landmark at the owner's expense in order to benefit the entire
city. 123 According to Justice Rehnquist this is the type of loss which
"in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole."12 4
Although some scholars concluded that Penn Central conclusively established the legitimacy of individual landmark preservation
statutes, 12 5 the majority was careful to note that, as in other takings
challenges, each case must be decided by considering the specific
facts and circumstances of that case. Thus, Penn Central left open
the question whether ordinances which do not contain transferable
development rights or which are not part of a comprehensive scheme
are legitimate.
B.

Challenges in Pennsylvania Courts

The first challenge to Pennsylvania's statute enabling municipalities to create historic districts"2 ' came in First Presbyterian
Church of York v. City Council of York. 2 7 The City Council of
York created a historic district in the central section of the city. The
York House, an example of Italian-Villa architecture and described
as the "finest Victorian house in the City", was located within the
historic district.1 28 The owner, First Presbyterian Church, decided to
tear the building down and use the lot for parking. 2 9 The City
Council refused to issue a demolition permit and the church appealed to the Court of Common Pleas."30 The church claimed that
denial of the demolition permit constituted a taking of property
under Article 1, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.' 3a The
123. Id. at 146.
124. Id. at 140 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
125. Commenting on Penn Central one scholar said: "Henceforth, the legitimacy of
preservation goals will not be questioned." Margaret V. Lang, Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City: Fairness and Accommodation Show the Way Out of the Takings
Corner, 13 URB. LAW. 89, 90 (1981).
126. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 8001-8006 (1986 & Supp. 1992).
127. 360 A.2d 257 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976).
128. Id. at 259. The York House was also listed on the National Register of Historic
Places. Id.
129. Id. at 261.
130. Id. at 259.
131. First Presbyterian Church of York v. City Council of York, 63 Pa. D. & C.2d 150,
152 (York County 1973). The York County Common Pleas Court noted that there was no
facial attack on the constitutional validity of the state enabling legislation, nor could there be
because the right to establish such historic preservation laws had been established in numerous
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 128 N.E.2d 557 (Mass. 1955);
Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314 (App. Div. 1968). The York
County Common Pleas Court found that the appropriate standard for determining if a taking
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church conceded the facial constitutional validity of the state's ena-

bling act and that York House had significant historical and architectural value.1 32 The church had presented evidence that it would
cost $29,900.00 to restore York House for church use, $17,000.00 to
repair fire damage, and $12,500 annually for maintenance.13 3

In determining if the ordinance effected a taking, the Commonwealth Court adopted the approach used in Maher v. City of New
Orleans;'3 i.e., whether refusal of the demolition permit precluded

use of the property for any purpose for which it was reasonably
adapted. The court noted that Pennsylvania has used this same stan-

dard for applications for variances from zoning regulations."3 5 The
court found that the church failed to meet its burden of proof; it
failed to show that the property could not be sold, that commercial
rentals could not provide a reasonable return, or that denial of the
permit foreclosed other potential uses of the property.13 6 The Commonwealth Court held that it was possible to convert York House to
a useful purpose without excessive cost. Therefore, the church failed
to show that the denial of the demolition permit precluded the prop-

erty from being used for any purpose for which it was reasonably
adapted.' 3 7
Judge Kramer concurred in the decision, but he voiced his
doubts about the limits of the police power to restrict the use of private property.' 3 8 He observed that over the last fifty years zoning
had occurred was that set forth in Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 288N.Y.S.2d
314 (App. Div. 1968). Sailors' Snug had determined that the denial of a permit for a historical building constitutes a taking if, in the case of a commercial property, it prevents an adequate return, and, in the case of charitable property, it prevents or seriously interferes with the
charitable purpose. The York County Common Pleas Court concluded that the case before it
would fall under the charitable property prong of the Sailors' Snug test, and remanded the
case to the City Council for further hearings. After further hearings the City Council again
denied the permit and the Common Pleas court upheld the Council's denial. First Presbyterian
Church of York v. City Council of York, 360 A.2d 257, 260 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976).
132. First Presbyterian Church of York v. City Council of York, 360 A.2d 257, 259 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1976).
133. Id. at 260.
134. 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975).
135. See, e.g., Peirce v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 189 A.2d 138 (Pa. 1963); McLean v.
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 185 A.2d 533 (Pa. 1961); Appeal of Lally, 171 A.2d 161 (Pa.
1961); Marple Gardens, Inc. v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 303 A.2d 239 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1973). A variance will not be granted merely because the property could be used more profitably for purposes prohibited by the zoning regulation. Rather, in order to obtain a variance, the
owner must establish that the property can not be sold or used for any purpose permitted by
the zoning regulation. First Presbyterian Church of York v. City Council of York, 360 A.2d
257, 261 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976).
136. First Presbyterian Church of York v. City Council of York, 360 A.2d 257, 261 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1976).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 262-63.
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and urban redevelopment laws had eroded the basic principles of private property. 1 9 Applauding the goals of historic preservation, he
feared, nevertheless, that legislatures and courts "have reached a
constitutional precipice and that an advancement of even a fraction
of an inch will result in excessive governmental encroachment upon
private property rights.""' Judge Kramer stated that the holding in
the case required the church to make its property available for public view without compensation. In effect, the court had established a
public museum through restrictions on the use of private property. "'
The approach set forth in First Presbyterian Church has been
utilized in Pennsylvania trial court decisions. In B.P. Oil, Inc. v. City
of Harrisburg"2 the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas affirmed the denial of a permit to B.P. Oil, which wished to demolish
an existing structure and replace it with a gas station. B.P.'s property was within the historic district created by the City Council of
Harrisburg.' 3 The court observed that although the property may be
used more profitably as a gas station, B.P. failed to show that the
property could not be sold or rented."" Thus, B.P. failed the First
PresbyterianChurch test; i.e., the denial of the permit must preclude
use of the property for any purpose for which it was reasonably
adapted in order to constitute a taking. Accordingly, the court refused to hold that denial of the permit amounted to a confiscatory
5
taking of the property."
In Cleckner v. Harrisburg,"6 the Dauphin County Court of
Common Pleas again held that Harrisburg's historic district ordinance did not effect a taking of two buildings within the district. The
buildings were deteriorated and the owner received an order to either
tear down the buildings or bring them into conformity with safety
regulations. 7 The owner applied for a permit to demolish the buildings. The City Council, on advice from the Board of Historical Architectural Review, denied the permit." 8 The evidence established
139. Id.
140. Id. at 263 (Kramer, J., concurring).
141. First Presbyterian Church of York v. City Council of York, 360 A.2d 257, 263 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1976)(Kramer, J.,concurring).
142. 99 Dauph. 182 (1977).
143. Id. at 183.
144. Id. at 185.
145. Id.
146. 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 393 (Dauph. County 1979).
147. Id. at 395.
148. Id. Although the owner disputed that the buildings had any historical value, the
court held that the Board did not abuse its discretion in determining that the buildings were
significant to the district. The court stressed that in historic districts the historical significance
of the property itself is not important but what is important is the linkage among the buildings
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that it would cost between $127,502.00 to $176,069.00 to restore the
buildings for rental use. 149 The court agreed that repair and rental
was not economically feasible, but the owner failed to show that sale
of the properties was not possible.' 50 The Court interpreted Maher v.
City of New Orleans"' and First Presbyterian Church of York v.
City Council of York' 52 to hold that the owner was required to proye
the ordinance rendered his property valueless and if sale was possible
there could be no taking. 5 '
As the previous discussion indicates, to establish a taking in
Pennsylvania a property owner has to overcome a very heavy burden
of proof. Prior to the United Artists case, discussed below, no Penn-

sylvania court had held that a historic preservation ordinance effected a taking of private property.
V.

The United Artists Case

The Boyd Theater, erected in 1928, is a rare example of an art
deco movie house.'" In 1986 the Philadelphia Historical Commission notified the owner that it was considering designating the theater as a historical landmark pursuant to The Philadelphia Historic
Buildings, Structures, Sites, Objects and Districts Ordinance.' After the owner's unsuccessful attempt to enjoin the Commission from
meeting to consider the proposed designation, 56 the Commission
in the district. The court found that the properties were linked historically to other nineteenth
century buildings in the district. Id. at 396-97.
149. Id. at 399.
150. Cleckner v. Harrisburg, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 393, 401 (Dauph. County 1979). Although the owner attempted to sell the properties by placing a sale sign on the buildings and
advertising in Preservation News, the court determined that the owner did not proceed prudently enough. The owner did not list the property with a real estate broker, did not advertise
in a local paper, and demanded an inflated asking price.
151. 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975).
152. 360 A.2d 257 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976).
153. Cleckner v. Harrisburg, 10 D. & C.3d 393, 401 (Dauph. County 1979).
154. See Sameric Corp. of Chestnut St. v. City of Phila., 558 A.2d 155, 156 n.2 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1989), rev'd sub nom. United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Phila., 595
A.2d 6 (Pa. 1991).
155. PHILA., PA., CODE § 14-2007 (1987). The ordinance provides that the Mayor shall
appoint a Philadelphia Historical Commission which shall "[d]esignate as historic those buildings, structures, sites and objects which the Commission determines . . . are significant to the
City." Id. § 14-2007(4)(a).
156. The owner filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia seeking a temporary restraining order to prevent the Commission from holding a hearing on the designation
of the Theater. The City removed the suit to federal court where it was dismissed because the
complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court noted
that only after the property was designated and the owner was denied a permit to alter or
demolish the structure could there be "any cognizable impact upon the plaintiff's rights."
Sameric Corp. of Chestnut St. v. Philadelphia Historical Comm., No. 87-553 Civ, 1987 WL
7636, at *1 (E.D.Pa. Mar. 5, 1987). Midway through the litigation the original owner of the
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held a public hearing on April 2, 1987.157 After hearing testimony on
the architectural features and significance of the theater, " the
Commission voted to designate the theater as historic. The owner

filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the Commission did
not have the authority to designate the theater as historic. 159
A.

The Commonwealth Court's Decision

Noting that this was a case of first impression in Pennsylvania,
the Commonwealth Court held that the Commission's finding that
the theater was historically significant was supported by substantial
evidence. 160 The court then addressed the issue of whether the Commission had exceeded its authority by designating the interior of the
theater as historic.1 61 Philadelphia's ordinance defined a building as
Boyd Theater, Sameric Corp., sold the theater to United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc.
157. United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Phila., 595 A.2d 6, 7 (Pa. 1991).
158. Philadelphia's ordinance sets forth criteria the Commission is to consider in deciding whether to designate a building as historic. Subsection 5 of the ordinance provides that a
building may be designated for preservation if it:
(a) Has significant character, interest or value as part of the development,
heritage or cultural characteristics of the City, Commonwealth or Nation or is
associated with the life of a person significant in the past; or,
(b) Is associated with an event of importance to the history of the City,
Commonwealth or Nation; or,
(c) Reflects the environment in an era characterized by a 'distinctive architectural style; or,
(d) Embodies distinguishing characteristics of an architectural style or engineering specimen; or,
(e) Is the work of a designer, architect, landscape architect or designer, or
engineer whose work has significantly influenced the historical, architectural, economic, social, or cultural development of the City, Commonwealth or Nation;
or,
(f) Contains elements of design, detail, materials or craftsmanship which
represent a significant innovation; or,
(g) Is part of or related to a square, park or other distinctive area which
should be preserved according to an historic, cultural or architectural motif; or,
(h) Owing to its unique location or singular physical characteristics, represents an established and familiar visual feature of the neighborhood, community
or City; or,
(i) Has yielded, or may be likely to yield, information important in prehistory or history; or
U) Exemplifies the cultural, political, economic, social or historical heritage
of the community.
PHILA.. PA.. CODE § 14-2007(5).
159. Sameric Corp. of Chestnut St. v. City of Phila., 558 A.2d 155, 156 n.1 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1989), rev'd sub nom. United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Phila., 595
A.2d 6 (Pa. 1991).
160. Id. at 157. The parties agreed that the owner's appeal of the Commission's decision
was subject to the Local Agency Law. In such an appeal the court must affirm the agency's
decision unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, the constitutional rights of the appellant are violated, or the procedural provisions of the local agency law are violated. United
Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Phila., 595 A.2d 6, 9 n.4 (Pa. 1991).
161. Sameric Corp. of Chestnut St. v. City of Phila., 558 A.2d 155, 157 (Pa. Commw.
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"a structure, its site and appurtenances created to shelter any form
of human activity."' 62 Reasoning that in order for a building to provide shelter it must have an interior, the court concluded that the
Philadelphia City Council had intended the definition of building to
include both the interior and exterior of a building. 163
Having established that the Commission did not exceed its authority by designating the interior of the theater as historic, the
court went on to consider whether designating the interior, nevertheless, amounted to an unconstitutional exercise of police power.' 64
The owner argued that designation of the interior exceeded the police power because the restrictions on the interior of the theater were
not substantially related to the public good.' 6 5 Citing a similar case
from the District of Columbia, 6 the court held that designation of

the interiors of historic buildings is substantially related to serving
the public purpose of preservation of the historic and aesthetic values

of the environment. 6 7 The Commonwealth Court noted that the
questions of whether a taking had occurred and whether the Commission properly denied the demolition permit were not before the
6 8
court.
B.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Decision
The owner appealed the Commonwealth Court's decision to the

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
transformed the case into a takings case. The court found that by
designating the theater as historic the City had taken the owner's
property for public use without just compensation in violation of the

Pennsylvania Constitution. 6 9
Ct. 1989), rev'd sub nom. United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Phila., 595 A.2d 6
(Pa. 1991).
162. Phila., Pa., Code § 14-2007(2)(b) (1987).
163. Sameric Corp. of Chestnut St. v. City of Phila., 558 A.2d 155, 157 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1989), rev'd sub nom. United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Phila., 595 A.2d 6
(Pa. 1991).
164. Id. at 158.
165. Id.
166. Weinberg v. Barry, 634 F.Supp. 86 (D.D.C. 1986).
167. Sameric Corp. of Chestnut St. v. City of Phila., 558 A.2d 155, 158 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1989), rev'd sub nom. United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Phila., 595 A.2d 6
(Pa. 1991). The public good of preserving the historic and aesthetic environment is embodied
in Article I Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
168. Sameric Corp. of Chestnut St., Inc. v. City of Phila., 558 A.2d 155, 159 n.15 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1989), rev'd sub nom. United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Phila., 595
A.2d 6 (Pa. 1991).
169. United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Phila., 595 A.2d 6, 7 (Pa. 1991).
Justice Larsen in his majority opinion relied heavily upon Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) and Judge
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As do most preservation ordinances, Philadelphia's ordinance
provided that the Department of Licenses and Inspection would not
issue a permit to alter or demolish a historic building if the Historical Commission has an objection.1"' The ordinance also provided
that a permit shall not be issued unless the Commission finds issuance necessary to the public good or that the building cannot be used
for any purpose for which it is or may reasonably be adapted."" The
ordinance incorporates nearly word for word the standard set forth
72
in First Presbyterian Church of York v. City Council of York.1
Further, the ordinance places an affirmative duty on the owner to
maintain the building at the owner's expense.173 If the owner fails to
maintain the building or obtain the proper permits before altering or
demolishing the property, the owner may be subject to criminal penalties 1 4 and be required to restore the building to its previous
condition.' 5
At the April 2, 1987 hearing, the owner's counsel stated that it
was his understanding that the only improvements the owner could
76
make without obtaining a permit was painting and papering.1
Counsel also noted that the owner could not even move a mirror
77
from one wall to another without the Commission's permission.1
The Commission did not dispute these observations.1 78 The court observed that when the theater was designated as historic "the Commission obtained almost absolute control over the property, including
' 79
the physical details and the uses to which it could be put.'
The court stressed that the ordinance singled out the theater
owner to bear the burden associated with historic preservation.
Kramer's concurring opinion in First Presbyterian Church of York v. City Council of York,
360 A.2d 257 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976).
170. PHILA, PA., CODE §§ 14-2007(7)(c), 14-2007(7)(g)(2) (1987).
171. Id. § 14-2007().
172. 360 A.2d 257, 261 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976).
173. Section 14-2007(8)(c) provides, in part, "[tihe exterior of every historic building
neglect of
* . . shall be kept in good repair as shall the interior portions of such buildings ...
which may cause or tend to cause the exterior to deteriorate, decay, become damaged or otherwise fall into a state of disrepair."
174. Section 14-2007(9)(c) provides that "[a]ny person who violates a requirement of
this Section or fails to obey an order issued by the Department shall be subject to a fine of
three hundred (300) dollars or in default of payment of the fine, imprisonment not exceeding
ninety (90) days."
175. Section 14-2007(9)(d) provides, in part, that "[a]ny person who alters or demolishes a building . . . in violation of the provisions of Section 14-2007 or in violation of any
conditions or requirements specified in a permit shall be required to restore the building ... to
its appearance prior to the violation."
176. United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Phila., 595 A.2d 6, 11 (Pa. 1991).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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Before the designation, the owner could have used the theater for
any lawful purpose just as neighboring property owners could and
still can use their properties. 180 Prior to designation the owner could
freely alter, revise, or remodel the theater just as neighboring property owners could and still can alter, revise, or remodel their
properties. 8 1
The court pointed out that landmark designation is different
from traditional zoning. In traditional zoning all property owners in
the area are restricted in the same manner "not only for the benefit
of the municipality as a whole but also for the common benefit of
one another." 182 Any decrease in property value caused by the zoning ordinance's restrictions is at least partially offset by an increase
in value resulting from similar restrictions on surrounding properties.18 With Philadelphia's landmark ordinance, however, there is no
reciprocity of advantage.18 Surrounding property owners are not restricted in the same way the owner of the theater is restricted. The
restrictions placed on the theater as a result of landmark designation
are for the benefit of the community at large, not the common benefit of a group of similarly situated property owners. The Court found
that singling out the Boyd theater for historic designation is akin to
"spot zoning" which the court had declared to be illegal. 88
The court determined that the purpose of requiring the owner to
maintain the theater in its present state is to benefit the city as a
whole. This is a public purpose the cost of which "in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."' 1' 8 If the city
wishes to do this it must pay just compensation in accordance with
1 87
Article 1 Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
88
Justice Cappy, joined by two other Justices,
concurred with
the result reached by the majority. Justice Cappy observed that the
ordinance's only reference to building interiors is in the affirmative
maintenance provision which provides that "[t]he exterior of every
historic building ... shall be kept in good repair as shall the interior
portions of such buildings ... neglect of which may cause or tend to
180. Id.
181. United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Phila., 595 A.2d 6, 11 (Pa. 1991).
182. Id. at 13 n.10.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Phila., 595 A.2d 6, 11 (Pa. 1991)
(quoting Pa. Public Utility Comm. v. Pa. Gas and Water Co., 424 A.2d 1213, 1218 (Pa.
1980)).
187. Id. at 13-14.
188. Chief Justice Nix and Justice McDermott joined in the concurring opinion.
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cause the exterior to deteriorate, decay, become damaged or otherwise fall into disrepair."18 9 The plain meaning of this provision is
that the interior of a building is to be considered only to the extent
that its disrepair would adversely affect the exterior of the building.190 Thus, the Commission's designation of the interior of the theater was improper. 19 '
Relying on the long standing rule that the court should not decide a case on constitutional grounds when it can be resolved on nonconstitutional grounds, 92 Justice Cappy contended that the court
should not have reached the takings issue.'9 3 Rather, the court
should have found that in designating the interior of the theater as
historic the Commission exceeded its authority under the ordinance
and, thus, the Commission's decision is without force and effect. 94
C.

Critique of the United Artists Case

The majority's opinion seems to be directly at odds with the
Supreme Court's decision in Penn Central. Philadelphia's landmark
ordinance is similar to the New York City landmark law which the
Supreme Court upheld in Penn Central.'9 5 Thus, had United Artists
been decided under the Fifth Amendment instead of the Pennsylvania Constitution a different result may have been reached.
1. New Federalism.-Although noting the applicability of the
Fifth Amendment, 9 6 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided the
97
United Artists case entirely under the Pennsylvania Constitution.
A provision of a state constitution may restrict government's power
more than a similar or even identically-worded provision of the Federal Constitution.' 9 8 In our federal system, the United States Constitution provides a minimum level of protection for individual
189. PHILA., PA., CODE § 14-2007(8)(c) (1987).
190. United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Phila., 595 A.2d 6, 14 (Pa.
1991)(Cappy, J., concurring).
191. Id.
192. See Krenzelak v. Krenzelak, 469 A.2d 987 (Pa. 1983); Ballou v. State Ethics
Comm., 436 A.2d 186 (Pa. 1981); Mt. Lebanon v. County Bd. of Elections, 368 A.2d 648 (Pa.
1977).
193. United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Phila., 595 A.2d 6, 14 (Pa.
1991)(Cappy, J., concurring).
194. Id.
195. See supra notes 98-125 and accompanying text.
196. The Fifth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
197. United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Phila., 595 A.2d 6, 11 n.8 (Pa.
1991).
198. ROBERT J. WOODSIDE, PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 117 (1985).
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rights. 199 The states, however, are free to provide more protection
through their state constitutions. 00 A decision based entirely on a
state constitution cannot be overturned by or even reviewed by the

United States Supreme Court. 01' Pennsylvania has recognized its
ability to interpret its constitution more broadly than the Federal
Constitution 0 2 and on a number of occasions has interpreted the

Pennsylvania Constitution to provide more protection to its citizens. 03s Thus, the question becomes not whether the decision was
correctly decided under the Fifth Amendment but whether it was
correctly decided under the Pennsylvania Constitution.
In First Presbyterian Church of York v. City Council of York,
the church alleged that denial of the demolition permit constituted a
taking under Article I Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.204 In that case the Commonwealth Court adopted the approach
of Maher v. City of New Orleans.2 0 5 If the refusal of the permit
precluded the use of the property for any purpose for which it was
reasonably adapted there was a taking. 0
First PresbyterianChurch of York v. City Council of York and
199. Western Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Connecticut General Life Ins.
Co., 515 A.2d 1331, 1333 (Pa. 1986).
200. Commonwealth v. Sell, 470 A.2d 457, 467 (Pa. 1983).
201. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489, 501 (1977). If the state court clearly states that its decision
rests on the state constitution the U.S. Supreme Court will accept the statement and not review the decision. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041-42 (1983). Justice Brennan argues
that the modern Supreme Court's contraction of federal rights should be viewed as an invitation for state courts to step in and interpret their constitutions in a manner so as to provide
protection of civil rights and individual liberties. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights
and The States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 548 (1986). More and more state courts have accepted the challenge and
are interpreting their own constitutions to provide more protection to their citizens than the
protection provided by the Federal Constitution. This is known as "New Federalism". Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 895 n.6 (Pa. 1991).
202. See, e.g., Western Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Connecticut General
Life Ins. Co., 515 A.2d 1331 (Pa. 1986); Commonwealth v. Tate, 432 A.2d 1382, 1387 (Pa.
1981); Commonwealth v. Hogan, 393 A.2d 1133, 1137 (Pa. 1978); Willing v. Mazzocone, 393
A.2d. 1155 (Pa. 1978); Martin v. Haggerty, 548 A.2d. 371 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988); Insurance
Adjustment Bureau v. Insurance Comm'r, 530 A.2d 132 (Pa. Commw. Ct 1987); Gundy v.
Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 478 A.2d 139 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984); Coades v.
Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 480 A.2d 1298 (Pa Commw. Ct. 1984).
203. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991)(refusing to find a
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule); Commonwealth v. Sell, 470 A.2d 457 (Pa.
1983)(interpreting Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution more broadly than the
Fourth Amendment); Conimonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283 (1979)(refusing to follow the
Supreme Court's decision that a citizen has no standing to object to seizure of the citizen's
bank records).
204. 63 Pa. D. & C.2d 150, 152 (York County 1973).
205. 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975).
206. First Presbyterian Church of York v. City Council of York, 360 A.2d 257, 261 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1976).
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the cases decided under it set up a very difficult burden for an owner
to meet in order to prove a taking. 20 7 Given the First Presbyterian
Church analysis, the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
United Artists finding a taking is surprising. Even after designation
the owner could have continued to use the property as a theater.
Although there was no evidence regarding the diminution in value
caused by the designation, the owner was able to sell the property
midway through the lawsuit. 20 8 Thus, it seems that the theater owner
was not denied all reasonable use of his property and under First
Presbyterian Church no taking had occurred.
Without explicitly rejecting the analysis under the Fifth
Amendment, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently has been
providing more protection to the "inherent and indefeasible" right of
Pennsylvania citizens to possess and protect their property. 20 9 For example, in a recent zoning case the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to join the growing number of jurisdictions which have upheld
the validity of prior nonconforming use amortization provisions in
zoning ordinances.2 10 The court stated that if the effect of a regulation is to deprive a property owner of the lawful use of his property it
" ' Stressing that
amounts to a taking requiring just compensation. 21
the amortization provision not only restricts the future use of property but also extinguishes the present use, the court found that such
provisions are per se confiscatory.21 2 While using the same analysis
as the Supreme Court uses in takings cases, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is more protective of private property rights than some
other courts.21 3
Even if the United Artist court had used the analysis the Supreme Court used in Penn Central the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
may still have found a taking. In Penn Central the majority was
convinced that there was a comprehensive scheme and an average
207. See supra notes 126-153 and accompanying text.
208. Of course, the new owner could have no reasonable investment backed expectations
frustrated by the designation because it bought the property fully aware of the designation and
pending appeal.
209. PA. CONST. art. I, §1.
210. Pa. Northwestern Distributors, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 584 A.2d 1372 (Pa.
1991). On May 4, 1985, claimant obtained all necessary permits and opened an adult bookstore. Less than one month later the township adopted a zoning ordinance restricting "adult
commercial enterprises". Id. at 1373. A provision in the ordinance required all existing nonconforming uses to comply with the ordinance within ninety days. Claimant was out of compliance with the ordinance and challenged the ordinance's validity. Id.
211. Id. at 1375.
212. Id. at 1376.
213. See 22 A.L.R.3d (1968) for courts that accept amortization of nonconforming use
provisions.
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reciprocity of advantage.2 14 The majority in United Artists, however,
believed that Philadelphia's ordinance provided no such comprehensive plan or average reciprocity of advantage.2 15 The United Artists
court concluded that individual property owners were singled out to
bear the burden of historic preservation without receiving any benefits by having other property similarly restricted.2 16 In Penn Central,
the Supreme Court's conclusion that there was a scheme and reciprocity of advantage seems rather incredible given that less than one
tenth of one percent of the property in the city was affected by the
ordinance. 1 7 Some would argue that the majority in United Artists
reached the conclusion on reciprocity of advantage which should
have been reached in Penn Central.2" 8
Because there are no bright line tests for determining if a taking
has occurred it is difficult to determine if the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court rejected the Supreme Court's analysis or merely reached a
different conclusion using that analysis. What is clear, however, is
that the United Artists decision goes against the clear trend of prior
decisions both in Pennsylvania and the rest of the nation.
2. The Goal of Historic Preservation.-Havingdecided that
the ordinance amounted to a taking, the United Artists court went
on to reject the Commission's argument that the values and goals of
historic preservation are embodied in the Pennsylvania Constitution.
The court also rejected the Commission's argument that the ordinance is a valid exercise of the police power.
The Supreme Court in Lawton v. Steel set forth a three part
test to determine the validity of a state's exercise of its police power:
first, the objective of the legislation must be within the scope of the
police power; second, the means utilized by the legislation must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose; and
214. Penn Central Transp. Corp. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 132 (1978).
215. See supra notes 182-185 and accompanying text.
216. United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Phila., 595 A.2d 6, 13 n.10 (Pa.
1991).
217. Penn Central Transp. Corp. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 147 (1978)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
218. In fact, Penn Central presented a far more compelling case for finding a taking
than the United Artists case. In Penn Central, the owners of Grand Central Terminal were
denied a building permit, which if granted would have resulted in millions of dollars of income
a year for the owner. In contrast, in United Artists, although the owner had been denied a
demolition permit, denial of that permit was not before the court. Rather, the court determined that there was a taking based solely on the burden placed on the theater owner as a
result of the designation of the building as historic and the affirmative duty to maintain the
theater.
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third, the means may not be unduly oppressive upon individuals. 21 9
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has expressly adopted this test for
determining the validity of police power enactments under the Pennsylvania Constitution.2 2 The court found that the ordinance failed
the third prong of the Lawton test - the ordinance singled out individual owners and amounted to a taking. However, in dicta, the
court also discussed the first prong of the Lawton test.
Relying on a 1926 decision,221 the court narrowly defined police
power as the power to control the use of property "for the public
good, its use otherwise being harmful."22' 2 However, Pennsylvania
courts have repeatedly rejected this narrow definition of the police
power, as have courts in other states. 223 In Swade v. Zoning Board
of Adjustment, 24 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reasoned that if
the only legitimate goal of land use regulations, such as zoning, is
the suppression of that which is offensive, zoning would be indistinguishable from the law of nuisance. 2" 5 "A state in the exercise of its
police power may, within constitutional limitations, not only suppress
what is offensive, disorderly or unsanitary, but enact regulations to
promote the public health, morals or safety and the general wellbeing of the community. ' 226 The legitimate objectives of the police
power are broad and as comprehensive as necessary to meet the demands of society.22 7 Thus, in narrowly defining the State's police
power, the United Artists court ignored a clear line of Pennsylvania
precedents which defined police power broadly.
The court in United Artists also stated that regulations enacted
for aesthetic reasons, conservation of property value, or stabilization
of economic values are not sufficient to promote the health, safety,
219. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
220. National Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Pa. Dept. of Envtl. Resources, 414 A.2d 37, 43
(Pa. 1980); see also Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., 306 A.2d 308, 317 (Pa. 1973);
Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker, 319 A.2d 871, 885 (Pa. 1974).
221. White's Appeal, 134 A. 409, 411 (Pa. 1926).
222. United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Phila., 595 A.2d 6, 12 (Pa.
1991)(quoting White's Appeal, 134 A. 409, 411 (Pa. 1926)).
223. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., 306 A.2d 308 (Pa. 1973); Swade v.
Zoning Board of Adjustment, 140 A.2d 597 (Pa. 1958); see also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26 (1954).
224. 140 A.2d. 597 (Pa. 1958). The Claimant sought a variance from a zoning ordinance that made his business illegal. He claimed he was entitled to the variance because his
business was not injurious to the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the community.
Id. at 598.
225. Id.
226. Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., 306 A.2d 308, 316 (Pa. 1973); see also Baconv. Walker, 204 U.S. 311, 318 (1907).
227. Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 371 A.2d 461, 467 (Pa. 1977).
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morals or general welfare.2 2 8 While there is case law in Pennsylvania
to support this dicta, Pennsylvania courts have many times held that
aesthetics and property values are legitimate considerations in a legislature's exercise of its power to promote the general welfare.22 9 The
Declaration of Public Policy section of the landmark ordinance sets
forth the ordinance's goals.2 30 That section indicates that the ordinance was enacted to promote the health, prosperity, and general
welfare of the people of Philadelphia.3 1 In any event, the court ignored Philadelphia City Council's pronouncement that historic preservation promotes the general welfare.
The legislature is the body which determines what promotes the
general welfare.2 32 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has often
stated that legislative enactments enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality.23 3 When a land use ordinance is attacked, the Court
presumes that the legislature acted with the purpose of serving the
general welfare.23 4 Even where it is fairly debatable whether the goal
of the ordinance is a proper objective of the police power, the court
can not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature. 235 Thus, in
rejecting the Commission's argument that the goal of historic preservation was a proper exercise of the police power the court failed to
accord the proper deference to the City Council's determination that
historic preservation is for the general welfare.
The court's dicta suggesting that historic preservation is not a
proper goal of the police power is especially disturbing given that the
objective of historic preservation is specifically embodied in the
Pennsylvania Constitution. Article 1 Section 27 of the Pennsylvania
228. United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Phila., 595 A.2d 6, 12 (Pa.
1991)(quoting Redevelopment Authority of Oil City v. Woodring, 445 A.2d 724, 727 (Pa.
1982)).
229. See, e.g., Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 141 A.2d 606, 612 (Pa. 1958); Bilbar
Construction Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 141 A.2d 851, 857 (Pa. 1958); Mont-Bux v. Twp. of
Cheltenham, 388 A.2d 1106, 1107 (Pa. Commw. Ct 1978); County of Fayette v. Holman, 315
A.2d 335, 339 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
230.

PHILA., PA., CODE 14-2007(l)(a) (1987).

231. The Declaration of Public Policy and Purposes provides:
It is hereby declared as a matter of public policy that the preservation and protection of buildings, structures, sites, objects and districts of historic, architectural, cultural, archaeological, educational and aesthetic merit are public necessities and are in the interests of the health, prosperity and welfare of the people
of Philadelphia.
Id.
232. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
233. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Parker White Metal Co., 515 A.2d 1358, 1370 (Pa.
1986); Patton v. Republic Steel Corp., 492 A.2d 411, 418 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
234. Bilbar Construction Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 141 A.2d 851, 856 (Pa. 1958).
235. Id.; see also Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
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Constitution provides:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the
environment. Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the
common property of all the people, including generations yet to
come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all people. " 6
This section of the Pennsylvania Constitution, known as the Environmental Protection Amendment, was ratified by the people of
Pennsylvania on May 18, 1971 237 Interpreting the amendment, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated, "[n]ow, for the first time, at
least insofar as the state Constitution is concerned, the Commonwealth has been given the power to act in areas of purely aesthetic or
historic concern."2 38 While the legitimacy of the goal of historic
preservation may have been in doubt prior to 1971, after enactment
of the Environmental Protection Amendment it is clear that the people of Pennsylvania consider historic preservation to be for the general welfare. Thus, historic preservation is a legitimate objective of
the police power. The United Artists court's suggestion otherwise is
in direct conflict with Article I Section 27 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.
In conclusion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision that
designation of the theater as historic amounted to a taking seems to
depart from prior precedents holding that to effect a taking a regulation must preclude use of the property for any purpose for which it is
reasonably adapted. Furthermore, the court was not justified in substituting its opinion for that of the Philadelphia City Council in finding that the goal of historic preservation is not a proper objective of
the police power.
VI. The Effect of United Artists on Historic Preservation in Pennsylvania and Suggested Reforms for Philadelphia's Historic Preservation Ordinance
A.

Potential Impact of United Artists
The United Artists decision will have no impact on the Pennsyl-

236.
vides that
237.
1973).
238.

PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. Pennsylvania is not the only state whose constitution prohistoric preservation is for the public welfare. See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d 588 (Pa.
Id. at 592.
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vania Historic Preservation Act.2 3 As discussed earlier the Historical Preservation Board of the Pennsylvania Historic and Museum
Commission nominates properties for inclusion on the Pennsylvania
Register of Historic Places. Inclusion on the Register is voluntary;
the property is not included on the Register if the owner objects.2 4
The court in United Artists specifically pointed out that this consent
provision forecloses the possibility that the property is taken without
just compensation.24 1 Other provisions of the Act deal with state
property and therefore the Pennsylvania Constitution's prohibition
against taking private property is not applicable.
On the other hand, the broad language of the United Artists
opinion could affect the state enabling statute.242 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court demonstrated its willingness to find that the burdens
a historical preservation ordinance places on a property owner
amount to a taking. The State enabling statute and local ordinances
enacted under it differ, however, in several important respects from
Philadelphia's Ordinance. First, and most importantly, the state enabling statute empowers local municipalities to designate only districts. It does not authorize the designation of individual landmarks.
Historic district legislation is more akin to zoning in that all the
properties in a district are similarly restricted. The restrictions
placed on the property are for the benefit of all property owners in
the district as well as the entire community, and the burden on an
individual owner is partially offset by the benefit of having other
property similarly restricted. The court in United Artists stressed
that Philadelphia's ordinance singled out individual property owners
to bear the burden of historic preservation.243 This is not so with
historic district legislation. There is an average reciprocity of advantage with district legislation.
Second, unlike Philadelphia's ordinance the state enabling legislation does not contain an affirmative maintenance provision. Although other courts have upheld such provisions,244 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court emphasized that Philadelphia's ordinance required
the owner to maintain the property at his own expense.
Third, although the court did not decide the United Artists case
239.
240.
241.
1991).
242.
243.
244.
Maher v.

37 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. §§ 501-505 (1992 Supp.).
Id.
United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Phila., 595 A.2d 6, 13 n.11 (Pa.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 8001-8006 (1986 and Supp. 1992).
United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Phila., 595 A.2d 6, 11 (Pa. 1991).
See, e.g., Figarsky v. Historic District Commission, 368 A.2d 163 (Conn. 1976);
City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975).
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on this ground, the Theater owner appealed the Commission's designation of the interior of the building. The state enabling legislation
makes clear that only the exterior of buildings which can be seen
from a public street or way are subject to the ordinances.2 45
These differences between Philadelphia's ordinance and the
state enabling legislation may very well save the state enabling statute and ordinances enacted under it from a court finding that a taking has occurred. Still, the court's dicta rejecting the claim that the
goal of historic preservation is a proper objective of the police power
places in question the legitimacy of even historic district legislation.
This dicta casts doubt on a municipality's power to designate enterprise zones and special services districts. 4 6 In fact, it casts doubt on
all land use regulations beyond use and density zoning. 47 Pennsylva.nia Senator David J. Brightbill, in supporting Wetland legislation,
stated that United Artists could be used to attack the DER's current
wetlands regulations.2

48

He stated that the regulations are "vulnera-

ble to similar and perhaps more devastating court challenges. 2 49
According to the director of the Pennsylvania Bureau of
Historic Preservation, the decision in United Artists has had a chilling impact on preservation efforts in Pennsylvania.25 0 The Philadelphia Historical Commission has stopped designating landmarks and
has indefinitely delayed hearings on four proposed historic districts.2 51 The city of Scranton has suspended its attempt to enact a
preservation ordinance.25 2 Pittsburgh has delayed declaring its Syrian Temple building a landmark,2 5 and at least seven other municipalities have postponed implementing preservation ordinances. 54 According to the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission,
"[l]ocal governments may decide to forgo any protection of historic
resources rather than face the expense and uncertainty of
245.
246.

§ 8004 (1991 Supp.).
Editorial, Good News for Wreckers It Could be Open Season on Historic BuildPA. STAT ANN. tit. 53,

ings: Thanks to a PA Supreme Court Ruling,

PHILA. INQUIRER,

July 22, 1991, at A08.

247. Thomas Hine, Murky Meanings of "Boyd" Decision, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 21,
1991, at 101.
248. David J. Brightbill, Clarifying Wetlands Legislation, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 7,
1991, at A12.
249. Id.
250. Thomas Hine, Meeting on Preservation Ruling, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 19, 1991 at
D03 (quoting Brenda Barrett, director of Pennsylvania Bureau of Historic Preservation).
251. Thomas Hine, For Preservationists, A Strategy Meeting, PHILA INQUIRER, Aug.
14, 1991, at D04.
252. Thomas Hine, City Wants Boyd Case Reheard, Asks New Ruling on Preservation,
PHILA. INQUIRER, July 26, 1991, at A01.
253. Id.
254. Hine, supra note 251, at D04.
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litigation." 5 '
Preservationists throughout the state have banded together to
discuss the decision and its implications.2 56 Many groups supporting
preservation filed amicus curiae briefs in support of the City's petition for reargument.2 57 Their efforts were successful; the court
agreed to rehear argument on the takings aspect of the case.
B.

Recommendations

The differences between Philadelphia's ordinance and the state
legislation on historic preservation may save the state legislation
from takings challenges. In addition, these differences show how
Philadelphia can amend its ordinance to avoid further challenges.
First, and most drastically, Philadelphia could make historic designation depend upon the owner's consent just as inclusion on the
State Register requires consent. This would eliminate any takings
challenge, but consent requirements severely limit the effectiveness
of preservation ordinances. Richard Tyler, Philadelphia's Historic
Preservation officer observed that "[t]he people who will consent to
certification are the people who would be doing the right thing anyway. 2 58 Once a property owner consents to certification, however,
subsequent owners would be bound by the certification because they
purchased the property with notice of the restriction.
Less drastically, Philadelphia could limit designation to historic
districts rather than individual landmarks. This solution is less than
ideal for Philadelphia given that it contains many buildings of historical significance which are not located within an area considered to
be historically significant. However, district legislation has the advantage of providing average reciprocity of advantage.
Next, the Philadelphia Historical Commission should cease
designating interiors of buildings as historic. As Justice Cappy's concurring opinion points out, the plain meaning of the ordinance belies
the argument that the City Council intended to grant the commis259
sion the authority to designate interiors.
255. Hine, supra note 252, at A01.
256. Hine, supra note 251, at D04.
257. Groups filing amicus briefs include The National League of Cities, The U.S. Conference of Mayors, The National Trust for Historic Preservation, and The American Planning
Association. Mark A. Tarasiewicz, Phila.'s Historic Preservation Law to be Reviewed by PA
Supreme Ct., PA. LAW J. REP., Sept. 9, 1991, at 9, 11.
258. Thomas Hine, Ruling on Preservation Means Little - or a Lot, PHILA. INQUIRER,
July 13, 1991, at A01.
259. United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Phila., 595 A.2d 6, 14 (Pa.
1991)(Cappy, J., concurring).
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Finally, Philadelphia will have to modify its designation procedure in order to comply with the requirements of due process. The
court in United Artists noted that a property owner whose property
is being considered for designation is entitled to a neutral and detached arbiter.2 6 The commission's own designation committee can
no longer recommend properties for designation, present testimony
and argument for designation, and then proceed to make the decision
to designate the property.
VII.

Other States' Decisions

The United Artists decision is contrary to the majority of decisions in the historic preservation area. No other court has held that
merely designating a property as historic constitutes a taking.26 1
Most other states which have considered the question have held that
historic preservation is a legitimate objective of the state's police
power. 62
In City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.21 1 the Supreme
Court of New Mexico held that the purposes of historic preservation
ordinances are within the scope of general welfare and therefore a
valid objective of the police power. 2 " The court noted that the role
of the judiciary is very narrow once the legislature has declared the
policy to be for the general welfare.2 6 5 Furthermore, although recognizing that particular applications of Historic District or Landmark
ordinances may rise to the level of an unconstitutional taking, 6
most challenges fail to meet the heavy burden of proving that the
ordinance effected a taking.2 67 Mayor of Annapolis v. Anne Arundel
County is representative of this difficulty. In that case the Court
of Appeals of Maryland decided that the denial of a demolition permit did not amount to a taking under the Maryland Constitution,
Id. at 8 n.1.
Henry Goldman, City Preservation Law Declared Unconstitutional, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 12, 1991, at A01 (quoting Maria Petrillo, Philadelphia Deputy Solicitor).
262. See, e.g., ASP Associates v. City of Raleigh, 258 S.E.2d 444 (N.C. 1979)(applying
the three part test of Lawton v. Steele); See also Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d
1051 (5th Cir. 1975); City of New Orleans v. Levy, 64 So.2d 798 (La. 1953); Donnelly Advertising Corp. v. City of Baltimore, 370 A.2d 1127 (Md. 1977); State v. Wieland, 69 N.W.2d
217 (Wis. 1955).
263. 389 P.2d 13 (N.M. 1964).
264. Id. at 17.
265. Id.
266. See, e.g., Citizens Comm. to Save Historic Rhodes Tavern v. District of Columbia
Dept. of Housing and Community Development, 432 A.2d 710 (D.C. App. 1981).
267. See, e.g., 900 G Street Associates v. Dept. of Housing and Community Development, 430 A.2d 1387 (D.C. 1981).
268. 316 A.2d 807 (Md. 1974).
260.
261.
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because the owner failed to show that it was denied all reasonable
use of the property.2 69
Given the difficult burden of proving a taking, challenges to historic preservation laws will likely be brought under state constitu- tional provisions on the theory that the state constitution provides
more protection than the Fifth Amendment.170 However, even where
challenges have been brought under state constitutional provisions,
the courts seem to have followed the same analysis as under the
Fifth Amendment. 7 1 But a property owner challenging a preservation ordinance would be wise to remember that state courts are free
to hold that the state constitution may afford more protection to
property owners than the Fifth Amendment.
VIII.

Conclusion

Landmark and historic district preservation legislation serves to
protect historically significant property by placing restrictions on the
property owner's ability to alter or demolish the property. The objective of such legislation is the promotion of the general welfare
through preservation. This is a legitimate police power objective and
is embodied in the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Pennsylvania
Constitution, however, also embodies the prohibition against private
property being taken for public use without just compensation. In
United Artists these two concerns came into conflict. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that Philadelphia's landmark ordinance, as
applied, took the owner's property without just compensation. In the
process of reaching this conclusion, the court cast doubt on the validity of all historic preservation ordinances in Pennsylvania. United
Artists stands alone among historic preservation decisions. It remains to be seen whether it will remain standing and, if so, whether
other courts will follow its lead.
Melissa E. Honsermyer

269. Id. at 822.
270. Challenges to historic preservation legislation based on the free exercise clause of
the First Amendment and similar state constitutional provisions have been more successful
than challenges based on the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., First Covenant Church v. City of
Seattle, 787 P.2d 1352 (Wash. 1990).
271. See, e.g., Mayor of Annapolis v. Anne Arundel County, 316 A.2d 807 (Md. 1974).

